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Abstract
This paper examines the investment strategies of regulated companies in abatement tech-
nologies, market participants’ trading behaviors, and the liquidity level in an inter-temporal
cap–and–trade market using laboratory experiments. The experimental analysis is performed
under varying market structures: the exclusive presence of regulated companies; the inclusion
of subjects not liable for compliance with environmental regulations; the availability of plain
vanilla options. In line with theoretical models on irreversible abatement investment, the first
experiment shows that regulated companies trade permits at a premium. At the same time
the existence of a strict enforcement structure effectively prompts investments in new tech-
nologies. The second experiment shows that the presence of non-regulated companies adds
liquidity to the market and does not increase price volatility. The last experiment enables
us to investigate the impact of the presence of cash-settled options contracts on the trading
strategies of regulated companies. Their expected emissions appears to play a significant role
in the choice of their options strategy.
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1 Introduction
Behind the global interest in marketable permits for air pollution is the recognition that any
meaningful climate change policy has to put a price on emitted carbon dioxide.1 Pricing emissions
is a fundamental lesson from environmental economics and the theory of externalities; the absence
of a price charge for scarce environmental resources such as clean air leads to excessive air pollution
(Baumol and Oates (1988)). The introduction of surrogate prices in the form of unit taxes or
marketable emission permits induces people to economize in the use of these resources.2 In
principle, emission permits embed an economic incentive that should force companies covered
by the regulation (hereafter regulated companies) to participate in the market for permits. The
basic rationale behind this market is that a high price level for emission permits should attract
those regulated companies with lower marginal costs for pollution abatement in order to exploit
consequent price differences. Such companies make profits by lowering their level of pollution
emissions by more than is necessary to comply with regulations and subsequently sell their extra
permits. An effective implementation of market-based instruments, therefore, should modify
the operational decisions of regulated companies, ultimately generating investments in process
improvements or adoption of low pollution–emitting technologies.
Since Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968), economists have shown (in a deterministic setting) that
a system of marketable permits can achieve a given level of emissions reduction in a low-cost
fashion. Similarly, after Montgomery (1972), several theoretical models have been proposed to
analyze the cost efficiency of a system of marketable permits and investigate its inter-temporal
properties. Among others, we refer to Rubin (1996), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Schennach
(2000), and Maeda (2004). At the same time, extensive literature on the use of laboratory ex-
periments to investigate emission trading programs has emerged and is thoroughly discussed by
Muller and Mestelman (1998), Isaac and Holt (1999) and, more recently, by Bohm (2003). Al-
though experimental procedures have been used to evaluate policy instruments, including some
aspects of emission trading programs (see Cason (1995), Cason and Plott (1996), Stranlund et al.
(2005), Murphy and Stranlund (2006) and Murphy and Stranlund (2007)), these techniques have
not yet been widely applied to investigate the relationship between the trading of permits and new
technology adoption –exceptions include Ben-David et al. (1999), much less to the study of the
impact of the presence of non–regulated companies or derivative contracts. In this paper we first
experimentally investigate the effects of uncertain total pollution emissions and strict enforcement
mechanisms on the timing of regulated companies’ investment in irreversible emission–abating
1We refer to Stern (2008) and Stern (2007), respectively, for an overview and a comprehensive discussion on the
economics of climate change.
2Cap–and–trade programs are currently quite popular. Examples include the Acid Rain Program in the U.S.,
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in Europe, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative signed by ten
northeastern states in North America. Canada and New Zealand, among other countries, are discussing plans to
develop similar schemes.
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technologies (hereafter low pollution–emitting technologies). We then extend our first experi-
mental setting and investigate the impact of the presence of non-regulated companies on the
trading efficiency of the permit market (measured with respect to the market liquidity). Finally,
introducing option contracts, we study the options trading pattern of regulated companies with
respect to their investments and permit trading strategies.
The control problem of investing in irreversible abatement equipment has been the subject of ex-
perimental methods (Ben-David et al. (1999)) and theoretical models (Chao and Wilson (1993),
Fullerton et al. (1997) and Taschini (2008)). The experimental platform we construct allows us
to study the investment and permit trading strategies of regulated companies. In line with the
earlier theoretical models, we find that the market price of emission permits does not necessarily
reflect the abatement cost. On the contrary, regulated companies trade permits at a –sometime
relatively high– premium. From potential sellers’ perspective, such a strategy might reflect com-
panies’ intent to recoup not only investment costs, but also obtain significant compensation for
undertaking an irreversible investment. Thus, depending on the cost nature of the low–emitting
technology, the permit price can deviate from its well-known theoretical level, i.e. the “true”
marginal abatement cost. Despite high investment costs, the potential significant cost of not
complying with the regulations effectively prompts companies to invest earlier in low pollution–
emitting technologies. This result has clear policy implications: the abatement investment efforts
of those companies facing irreversible investments are driven by the possibility of making large
profits (by selling extra permits) and, equally important, avoiding potential severe losses due to
the existence of strict enforcement mechanisms.
Stochastic equilibrium models have been recently employed to determine the dynamic price of
emission permits while also assessing various policy aspects - Seifert et al. (2008) discuss compa-
nies’ risk aversion, Chesney and Taschini (2008) investigate the effect of asymmetric information
on permit price formation, Carmona et al. (2009) analyze the effect of windfall profits, and Gru¨ll
and Kiesel (2009) provide a theoretical sound discussion on the permit price slump in the first
phase of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Although all these models
provide a deeper understanding of the dynamic formation of the price of emission permits in a
stochastic framework, they do not explicitly account for the presence of non-regulated companies
in the permits market.3 These are companies not subject to environmental regulations, but ac-
tive in the permit market. Such a group includes financial institutions, brokers, and eco–friendly
non–for–profit organizations. Lately, some stakeholders have raised concerns about the possible
harmful impact of speculators in the markets for pollution control. In response, legislators pro-
posed to limit participation to regulated companies by excluding non–regulated companies from
3Focusing on pricing contingent claim contracts in an equilibrium framework, the paper of Kijima et al. (2010)
is the only article accounting for the participation of non-regulated entities in the permit market.
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the market. An example of such an attempt is the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s
Renewal (CLEAR) bill (S 2877), introduced by Senator Maria Cantwell. The second experiment
addresses these concerns.
By introducing two new types of players not subject to environmental regulation (eco-groups
and speculators) we evaluate their impact in terms of market liquidity and permit price volatility.
On the one hand we observe that non-regulated companies are natural permits buyers, especially
at the beginning of each experimental round. They directly enhance the liquidity of the permit
market, thereby favoring investments in low pollution–emitting technologies. Such a result is
statistically significant and particularly evident in the last rounds of each experimental session.
Despite few observations of trading behaviors of non–regulated subjects that would add to price
variability, there is no statistically significant effect on volatility. This result is consistent with
Ben-David et al. (1999), who investigated the price variability in a market with more heteroge-
neous traders and found weak evidence for larger price volatility. Our findings, therefore, align
with some of the concluding remarks of a recent report on carbon markets released by an inter-
agency working group led by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: “Open market
participation promotes the development of market liquidity. . . Therefore, [US] carbon markets
should encourage broad participation.”
Lately, numerous exchanges have been offering derivative contracts on emission permits. The
analysis of the concomitant presence of market-based instruments other than spot or futures con-
tracts on emission permits is rather scant in literature. Understanding how this market works is
important for those stakeholders concerned about the need to regulate such instruments. Labora-
tory experiments are a useful method for exploring possible outcomes given the current, limited
experience. This last experiment allows us to investigate the option trade pattern of market
participants, particularly that of regulated companies. We argue that the supply and demand
schedule of options contracts reflects the regulated company’s status with respect to technology
adoption, their then (spot) permit portfolio, and their (expected) future total emissions at the
moment the option(s) are traded. In particular, we observed that regulated companies with an
expected shortage of permits tend to buy call or (possibly) sell put options. Regulated companies
with an expected excess of permits tend to buy put or (possibly) sell call options. Orders to buy
puts or sell calls are, however, less observed when regulated companies are in permit excess. The
options contracts we consider are European cash-settled contracts. The cash-settlement provision
prevents any impact on the initial cap (the original environmental target) and the overall number
of permits in circulation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design
and the procedures common to each experiment. Section 3 presents the results of the first
experiment (irreversible investment in abatement technology amidst uncertainty about emissions
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and abatement costs). Section 4 and Section 5 discuss the second (presence of non-regulated
subjects) and the third (concomitant presence of options contracts) experiments. The last section
concludes.
2 Experimental Protocol
The aim of our experiments is to simulate a cap-and-trade system that replicates a simplified
version of the EU ETS market for permits. Our attention focuses on the problematic decision of
achieving compliance at minimum cost. To meet this target, regulated companies, depending on
their situation, have the option of adopting an irreversible and costly cleaner technology, buying
or selling the permits, utilizing permits, or any feasible combination thereof. The adoption of the
new technology is undertaken in the presence of uncertain emissions and, consequently, uncertain
abatement costs. Regulated companies that do not offset their emissions face severe penalties
which are strictly enforced. The impact (i) of trading and investment strategies on the dynamics
of the allowance price; (ii) of trading between regulated and non–regulated agents on the market
liquidity; and also the trading pattern of option contracts with respect to the status quo of
regulated agents, are the subjects of our analysis.
The basic setup is an emission trading scheme where the number of regulated companies (hereafter
RCs) is given and fixed, (I). The policy regulator sets an initial number of permits, i.e. the cap,
and then distributes permits to RCs based on some specific criteria. We assume that the cap is
set with respect to a given historical emission volume in a reference period, the so-called baseline
year. In this experiment, such a reference level is the expected emission volume before a change
in the production process takes place. As the aim of the regulator is to curb emissions, the
initial allocation of permits to RCs corresponds to a pre-specified fraction {γ, 0 < γ < 1} of their
reference emission volume. Various allocation criteria exist. Here we consider and implement the
criteria according to which permits are allocated for free, so-called grandfathering.4
RCs are characterized by their emissions and income profiles. However, for the sake of in-
terpretation of the investment and trading strategies, we adopt a partial equilibrium approach.
In particular, we work under the assumption that the adoption of technological innovation re-
duces emissions, but does not influence the output quantity and price. Therefore, we disregard
RCs’ decision on output production and assume RCs are price takers in the output market.5 We
4The European Union Emission Trading Scheme currently implements a grandfathering allocation criterion.
This grants RCs an initial number of permits equal to a certain percentage of their pollution emitted at a fixed
baseline year. In the first phase, 1990 was the baseline year for the majority of the participating European countries.
We refer to Aihman and Zetterberg (2005) for a comprehensive discussion about other allocation criteria of emission
permits.
5The analysis of the inter-relationship between permit and output markets has been undertaken by Misolek and
Elder (1989), Hahn (1983), and Malueg (1990) respectively. Wra¨ke et al. (2008) use a laboratory experiment to
assess how much of the permits’ value is passed on by participants through output electricity prices.
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assume the abatement investment can only occur once during the regulated period [0, T ], and
that it is irreversible.6 Consistent with the theoretical equilibrium models of Seifert et al. (2008),
Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Carmona et al. (2009), pollution emissions Qi(t) are uncertain,
{Qi(t), t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; i ∈ I}. In order to keep our model tractable, we consider the following
simple, binomial dynamics for the emissions at each period t:
Qi(t) =
{
qiu, with probability p.
qid, with probability 1− p,
where qiu > q
i
d, for i ∈ I. (1)
The factors qiu and q
i
d denote the production regime of the i-th RC from time t − 1 to t. RCs’
productions are subject to economic and financial shocks, among other factors. These are assumed
to be exogenous, with the demand for an RC’s products contingent on phenomena beyond its grasp
(a widespread crisis or a product demand collapse, for example). When demand is high, RCs’
emissions are high (qu), whereas a lower demand is represented by lower emissions (qd). p indicates
the probability of the event high demand and, for the sake of participants’ computational efforts,
it is assumed constant and equal to 50%, i.e. p = 0.5. The realization of the states of the economy,
however, are drawn from I independent uniform distributions. Pollution emissions, therefore, are
purely random in the experiment. Nevertheless, because state probabilities are constant and
independent, it is straightforward to compute the expected total volume of emissions. Recalling
Equation (1), the total volume of pollution emitted at time t by the i-th RC is simply given
by the sum of all emissions up to time t, i.e.
∑t
s=0Q
i·(s), where {· = (old, new)} indicates old
or new technology. We also consider two different types of regulated companies: high {H}
and low {L} emitters and we label them High-RCs and Low-RCs, respectively. As described





old(s)], where i ∈ {H,L}, and E represents the expectation operator.
By construction, High-RCs are characterized by a higher expected emission volume as opposed








old(s)], where h ∈ {H} and l ∈ {L}. Consequently,
High-RCs receive a higher initial number of permits than Low-RCs.
At the end of the compliance period, the regulator requires RCs to reconcile their permit
holdings with their accumulated emissions. In practice, each RC must own a sufficient number of
emission permits to cover the final pollution volume at the end of each experimental session. Con-
versely, a penalty, P, per missing permit is levied. In our experiments this parameter corresponds
to 40 units of experimental money. RCs control their compliance strategy adopting an irreversible
and costly cleaner technology, buying or selling the permits, utilizing permits, or any feasible com-
bination thereof. More precisely, at every period t = 1, 2, . . . , T, each RC can (i) decide (if not
6We refer to Chao and Wilson (1993), Fullerton et al. (1997) and Taschini (2008) for theoretical models which
address the problem of investing in irreversible emission abatement equipments. Using laboratory market experi-
ments, Ben-David et al. (1999) investigates technological heterogeneity and irreversible investment.
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done before) to undertake an abatement investment that reduces the future expected emission
volume, and (ii) trade permits or (iii) hold on to the number of allowance possessed. Whether
undertaken by a High-RC or a Low-RC, the investment in low pollution–emitting technology is an
irreversible and costly decision that is assumed to reduce the expected pollution emissions. Be-
cause the overall regulated period is finite, T, the adoption of the abatement technology generates
a limited in time benefit. Further, pollution emissions, and consequently emission reductions, are
uncertain. The opportunity cost (benefit) to adopt low pollution–emitting technologies, therefore,
is uncertain as well.
For convenience, an identical initial budget is allocated to all RCs. Let I represent the cost
for installing the new technology and let us set I equal to a fixed fraction α of the initial budget.
Because initial budgets are identical and RCs are characterized with respect to the intensity of
their emissions, High-RCs and Low-RCs face different opportunity costs when adopting the new
technology.7 At every period t, we can quantify the time-dependent opportunity cost to invest in












] , i ∈ {H,L} and t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. (2)
Here Qiold(s) and Q
i
new(s) represent the emission at time s before and after the adoption of
the low pollution–emitting technology, respectively. Figure 2 represents graphically the time-
dependent and intensity-specific opportunity cost of adopting a new technology that halves the
high pollution emissions scenario. In particular, Figure 2 represents the expected cost per reduced
unit of emission for both Low-RCs (left) and High-RCs (right) when α = 40%. Intuitively, the
later the adoption of the new technology, the shorter the useful remaining time period and,
consequently, the higher the expected cost per unit of reduced emission.
According to the net-present-value approach, Ci(t) is the critical level at time t at which the
decision to adopt the new technology should be taken by company i. If the permit market price
is higher than Ci(t), the i-th company would be better off selling permits and using the proceeds
to finance the technology adoption. A larger permit supply, and a corresponding reduction in the
permit demand, would then induce lower future permit prices. Conversely, if the permit market
price is lower than Ci(t), the i-th company would be better off buying cheaper permits and not
adopting the low pollution–emitting technology. In this case we would expect an increase in the
future permit market price.8
7Due to more stringent air quality regulations in recent years, newer plants typically have more sophisticated
emissions control technology already installed. So, for a given industrial sector and a given level of output, compa-
nies employing old technology (High-RCs in our case) often emit relatively higher amounts of pollution emissions
and can typically control them more cheaply.
8Such a strategy assumes instantaneous investments and unlimited availability of market counter-parties.
7
Experimental Procedure Experiments were conducted at the Laboratory of the Department
of Banking and Finance of the University of Zurich. The subject pool was composed of graduate
students, mostly with economic or finance background. Based on students’ answers to a question-
naire distributed at the beginning of each session, most of them had a good understanding of the
dynamics involved in the game.9 After all subjects arrived for the session, they were randomly
assigned to a private computer. Each session began with an instruction period. Once everyone
finished reading the instructions and answering the controlling questions, the first trading round
began. The relatively simple construction of the experimental market did not require subjects to
participate in training sessions, and instructions provided to subjects were sufficiently detailed to
avoid extra oral explanations.
The experiment consisted of six sessions (two without, two with non-regulated companies, two
with non-regulated companies and option contracts). Each session had four rounds, with each
round consisting of 20 periods (60 seconds per period). Every trading period, therefore, is repeated
160 times (corresponding to a minimum number of 160 decisions per experiment). The number
of subjects in the experiments ranged from 12 (only RCs) to 18 (12 RCs plus non RCs) per
session, for a total of 88 subjects and a constant number of RC’s throughout all experiments.
The first experiment (two sessions) ran over Z-Tree, a toolbox designed for economic experiments
at the Institute for Empirical Economics of the University of Zurich. Subsequently, we developed
an ad-hoc java-based experimental platform. In all sessions the main parameters were fixed
and clearly stated in the instruction paper as shown in Table 1. An excerpt of the instruction
paper is included in the Appendix. Each computer screen reported all relevant information. In
particular, emission intensities (qiu, q
i
d) and their probability p, the cost for abating emissions, and
firm-specific initial number of allowances were reported on each screen.




i(s)) and the corresponding remaining number of unused emission permits. This last
number corresponds to the sum of all permits purchased or sold up to time t, plus the initial
number of permits, minus the present emission volume. A negative number implies a current









j(s)), and the time series of
the permit price (S(s), s = 0, . . . , t) are reported graphically. Similar to the model of Chesney
and Taschini (2008), the aggregate emission volume is observable with a one-period lag.10 The
computer screen also reports the current emission volume, as well as the maximum and minimum
expected emissions (respectively, aggregate emissions) volumes for RCi (respectively, including
9Although most of the students had a clear interest in the compliance managerial tasks, students’ motivation
was not a concern given the fundamental trading decisions under investigation in the experiments.
10A one time lag imposed on the observation of others emissions accommodates the realistic existence of non-
perfect information. We refer to the model of Chesney and Taschini (2008) for further discussion about the modeling
of partial information and its theoretical implication on dynamic equilibrium pricing.
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Global Parameters
Number of rounds 4
Number of periods T 20
Number of High-RCs and Low-RCs 10-14
Initial lab. money RCs 1.000
Penalty P 40
Investment cost I 400
{qLu , qLd } {12, 5}
{qHu , qHd } {30, 10}
States probability, p 50%
Percentage of free allocated permits 70%
Number of free allocated permits {119, 280}
Extra Parameters
Initial money eco-groups 2.000
Initial money speculators 4.000
Table 1: The first set of global parameters characterizes all three experiments. The extra parameters are
information relevant for the last two experiments.
every RCj , j = 1, . . . , I, j 6= i). A screen shoot that includes these information is reproduced in
the appendix. A number of relevant information is, therefore, provided to market participants
and ultimately reflected in the observed permit price dynamics.
This experiment places RC-subjects in a decision context that resembles the situation a regulated
company faces in a typical emissions-constrained economy. Every company produces and, as a
by-product, pollutes. However, at a pre-specified date each regulated company has to surrender
a sufficient number of permits. As mentioned before, we assume that the adoption of a low
pollution–emitting technology reduces emissions but does not influence the output quantity. This
allows us to disregard the subjects’ decision on output production. Thus, the adoption of low–
emitting technology, the trading of emission permits, and the utilizing of permits are the only
alternatives at RCs’ disposal to control emissions and achieve compliance. Such decision strategies
are modeled here in a discrete dynamic framework. At every period t the computer screen shows
two distinct columns where each player can enter her/his bid or ask offers and the corresponding
quantity of permits she/he is willing to buy or sell. Offers must respect budget and permit
portfolio constraints. A player could also decide to hold on to the permits possessed by pressing a
specific button (“No selling - No buying”). At every period, each RC can also decide to undertake
(if not done previously) an irreversible abatement investment by clicking the button “Change
technology”. As a result, the corresponding higher emission level is halved and her/his budget
is reduced by an amount equal to α · I. At the end of each session, which corresponds to period
T , the computer screen reports the final budget, net potential penalty costs for RCs, and the
final net number of permits. All subjects are financially rewarded based on their performances.
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Recalling that emission permits have no redemption value after T , each subject’s final payoff
simply depends on her/his final budget.
Each i-th regulated company starts with an initial budget of 1,000 units of experimental money
and γ ·E[∑Ts=0Qiold(s)] allowances. RCs’ objective is clearly: maximize profits while meeting com-
pliance. In the experiment, RCs’ profit corresponds to CHF 0.6 for every 100 units of remaining
experimental money (net potential penalty costs at maturity).11 Eco-groups and speculators, two
types of players not subject to environmental regulations (non-RC) and introduced in the second
experiment, receive an initial budget that is double and quadruple, respectively, the RCs’ initial
budget. As they are excluded from regulations, however, they do not receive initial emission per-
mits. Recalling that non-regulated companies have no compliance obligations, their performance
depends exclusively on their trading strategies. Speculators, labelled FIs, are rewarded based
on their final amount of experimental money in excess of their initial budget. Performances of
eco-groups, labelled NGOs, are measured in terms of final permits holdings. In particular, every
FI obtained CHF 1.20 for every 100 units of experimental money beyond the initial 4.000; and
every NGO obtained CHF 1 for every 10 permits. Because emission permits have no redemption
value, it is in the FIs’ best interest to disinvest their permit portfolio before period T, whereas
NGOs simply needs to collect as many permits as possible (more on this later).
The average earnings per RC were CHF 35, whereas the average earnings per FI and NGO were
CHF 25 and CHF 32, respectively. These amounts include a CHF 15 show-up fee to encourage
prompt arrival. Once subjects are paid, they are excused from the laboratory. All sessions lasted
approximately 2 hours.
Market Price Mechanism The following steps comprise a single period of a session for all
three experiments under investigation. Every player can enter her/his so-called “revealed” de-
mand (or supply) schedule for permits in the form of a combination of a bid (or ask) price and the
corresponding permits quantity. The market price mechanism which administers all transactions
and then informs each subject whether her/his purchase or sale, is quite standard. In each period
bids are ranked from high to low, and offers from low to high. This generates a “revealed” demand
and “revealed” supply schedule similar to that shown in Figure 3. The total number of transac-
tions of emission permits is determined by the intersection of the demand and supply schedules
at each period. As we are in a discrete setup, this market price is in fact the one that maximizes
the overall traded quantity of permits. This mechanism is commonly proposed in designing order
books and also operationalized in several experimental economics papers.12 In the presence of
a non-unique maximum quantity, we consider the so–called first mover advantage criteria that
identifies one unique solution in a quite simple manner. Let us define Λ as the set of prices that
11Negative values correspond to a zero payoff.
12This scheme is presented in more detail in Schindler (2007). Cason and Plott (1996) and Cronshaw and Kruse
(1999) employ a similar procedure to determine the price of SO2 permits in the U.S. market.
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maximizes the quantity traded. If the first price in chronological order in Λ is a bid-price, then
the market price corresponds to the min{Λ}. Conversely, if the first price in chronological order
in Λ is an ask-price, then the market price corresponds to the max{Λ}. After all transactions are
completed, permit stocks and monetary balances are updated, I new emission realizations are
drawn from a uniform distribution and the next period begins.
3 Experiment one: adoption of irreversible abatement technol-
ogy and permit price
The percentage of Low-RCs and High-RCs that do not adopt the new technology in any period
is the highest in the first round. This is observable across all six sessions. Penalty payments,
in fact, severely decrease in magnitude and frequency in the subsequent rounds. As Figure 4
suggests, a possible learning effect vanishes immediately after the first round. Results from the
first rounds, however, should not be disregarded. They convey relevant policy implications. The
impossibility to borrow permits from future -next round- allowances allocation let RCs be faced
with their inability to meet compliance in a advisable fashion. The lack of borrowing provisions,
implemented in the experiment with a marked separation between consequent rounds, therefore,
reinforces the incentive to undertake irreversible investments. Such a policy feature, together
with the presence of a strict enforcement structure, represented by an unavoidable compliance
verification process and high penalties for non-compliance, effectively spur investments in new
technologies. This is graphically observable also in Figure 5. The upper diagram of Figure 5
represents the percentage of Low-RCs and High-RCs that adopt the new technology immediately,
i.e. at period 1. The number of regulated companies that undergo a low–emitting technology
adoption increases dramatically across the four rounds. The lower diagram of Figure 5 reports
the percentage of Low-RCs and High-RCs that never adopt low–emitting technology across the
four rounds. This number decreases quite significantly across the four rounds. Table 2 investigates
the adoption of low–emitting technology round-by-round. Consistent with Figure 5, Table 2 shows
that the majority of RCs in fact adopt the new technology quite early, i.e. during the first periods.
Median (period) round 1 round 2 round 3 round 4
High-RC 3 1 1 1
Low-RC 9 1 1 1
Table 2: Median of the period of technology adoption across all sessions.
As reflected by the variation in the slope of the percentage of RCs that never adopt the new
technology, this effect is stronger for High-RCs. The lower diagram of Figure 5, in fact, shows a
constant decrease in the percentage of High-RCs that never adopt the low–emitting technology.
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On the contrary, a significant number of Low-RCs prefer to hold on to the abatement investment.
The rationale behind such a result is the fact that High-RCs and Low-RCs are faced with different
incentives in investing in the new technology. To better understand this, let us differentiate among
the compliance status of RCs. In general, a low permit price makes the investment in the new
technology a non-viable strategy. RCs in permits shortage would find compliance by means of
allowance purchase a cheaper alternative. Conversely, a high permit price increases potential
profits from the sale of extra permits and raises potential compliance costs due to uncovered
emissions. In practice, each RC tries to answer the question: will the irreversible pollution-
reducing capital-spending cost less than the potential revenues from allowance sales plus avoided
penalties? Or would waiting to invest in the new technology and perhaps offset emissions by
purchasing cheap allowances be a better strategy? This might provide incentives for some RC
to free ride on the other firms’ investments. Because Low-RCs face low opportunity costs, as
opposed to High-RCs, such an incentive might be stronger for them.13 It is important to notice
that in all experiments, regardless of the different opportunity costs, the potential compliance
costs and the enforcement structure are sufficiently stringent to render an irreversible investment
in low pollution–emitting technology a viable alternative for Low-RCs. Such a strategy is evident
starting from the second rounds, as reported in Figure 5.
The first experiment also conveys a second relevant result which is intimately related to the
previous discussion. Under irreversible and limited-in-time abatement technology adoption, the
permit price does not necessarily reflect the proxy for the marginal abatement cost we introduced
in Equation (2). Given the fixed investment cost structure, the marginal abatement cost can be
approximated by the expected cost per reduced unit of emissions, C(t). Assuming this holds,
the difference between the marginal abatement cost and the observed permit price can be easily
computed. A Low-RC (High-RC) that, for instance, adopts the low–emitting technology at period
one, or keeps the old technology, should be expected to offer or to buy permits at a price in the
range of 7-8 (2-3) units of experimental money. This is not the case, as shown graphically by
Figure 6 and Figure 7. These figures, similar to those observable in the previous sessions, represent
the marginal cost approximation for Low-RCs and High-RCs compared to the allowance price
observed during the four rounds of the 5th and 6th sessions, respectively. Consistent with the
findings of Chao and Wilson (1993), Fullerton et al. (1997) and Taschini (2008), RCs typically
offer to sell or to accept to buy permits at a premium. Observed prices, therefore, are often higher
than their expected cost per reduced unit of emissions. The premium that sellers charge reflects
their intent to recover technology costs including a significant compensation for undertaking
an irreversible abatement investment. In a similar way, the savings realized by postponing the
irreversible abatement investment justifies the premium buyers accept to pay.
13This classic free-rider strategy is more risky in the presence of a larger number of competing buyers (including
non-regulated companies) in the market for permits.
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4 Experiment two: non-regulated companies, (il)liquidity and
trading efficiency of the permit market
By definition, emission permits are fully transferable. In particular, permits could be traded
by companies not subject to environmental regulations. An experimental investigation of the
potential impact of such market players on the permit market liquidity is lacking. This section
investigates how the presence of non-regulated companies influences the liquidity level and the
trading efficiency of the permit market. Moreover, because companies not subject to environ-
mental regulations have priorities and objectives different from those of regulated companies, the
impact of the presence of non-RCs on the overall price variability is discussed as well.
This section expands the experimental platform described in the previous section. In particular,
we introduce two new stylized types of market participants: eco-groups and pure speculators.
Eco-groups (hereafter NGOs) represent those institutions that desire to retire permits, thereby
denying their use to legitimize emissions and, consequently, create permit scarcity. The lack
of permits should be reflected in higher permit prices and, ultimately, in stronger incentives to
adopt low pollution–emitting technologies. NGOs’ optimal strategy is, therefore, to withdraw
from the market as many permits as possible given their budget constraints. Pure speculators
(hereafter FIs), instead, represent true profit seekers who consider the permit market as a new
opportunity to realize profits. FIs’ optimal strategy is clearly to buy permits first and then sell
them in the market at a profit. Non-regulated companies, in fact, do not receive emission permits.
Both NGOs and FIs, therefore, need to purchase permits before being able to actively participate
in the permit market. As a result, NGOs and FIs are natural permit buyers, especially at the
beginning of each round, and significantly contribute to permit market liquidity. The relevance of
having a sufficient number of potential permit buyers is particularly important in the third and
fourth rounds. In these rounds, as observable in Figure 5, the majority of the RCs undertake the
investment in the low pollution–emitting technology. In principle, the higher the number of RCs
that undertake the investment, the larger the potential quantity of permits that can be offered
for sale. Clearly, an excessive supply of permits that is not offset by sufficient demand depresses
allowance prices. In this case extra buyers participating in the market might be helpful. Indeed,
we observe that the presence of NGOs and FIs sustains the permit price at the beginning of these
rounds and maintains market liquidity afterwards.
The contribution of non-regulated companies is analyzed in terms of impact on the liquidity level
of the permit market. We propose two measures that attempt to quantify the liquidity level under
three different conditions: “RCs” corresponds to a permit market without non-regulated com-
panies; “RCs/1 NGO/1 FI” corresponds to a permit market with 1 eco-group and 1 speculator;
and “RCs/3 NGO/3 FI” corresponds to a permit market with 3 eco-groups and 3 speculators.
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Considering a total of six sessions, each condition has been tested twice. Each pair contains a
constant number of 24 regulated companies and, therefore, a constant number of distributed al-
lowances granting a coherent comparison of the liquidity level (total available allowances) among
the three pairs of sessions. An ANOVA analysis comparing the variation within treatments with
the variation across treatments is used to assess the impact on the liquidity level.14 Non signif-
icance of the test associated with the one-way analysis of variance implies that the presence of
non-regulated companies has no effect on the liquidity level of the permit market. Conversely,
significance implies that the liquidity level is statistically different in the presence of non-RC
market participants.15
The first measure T (t), labeled as effective trades, counts the number of buyers’ and sellers’ offers
that are successfully matched. The measure T (t) quantifies at each period t ∈ [0, . . . , T ] of every
round the number of trades that successfully take place and, therefore, measures the activity level
of the permit trading market.
All Companies N Mean Std. dev. Std error Min Max
RCs 160 1.87 1.85 0.14 0 8
RCs/1 NGO/1 FI 160 2.41 1.77 0.14 0 7
RCs/3 NGO/3 FI 160 3.16 2.07 0.16 0 9
Only RCs N Mean Std. dev. Std error Min Max
RCs 160 1.87 1.85 0.14 0 8
RCs/1 NGO/1 FI 160 1.97 1.57 0.14 0 7
RCs/3 NGO/3 FI 160 2.29 1.74 0.13 0 7
Table 3: Summary statistics of the effective trades measure T (i.e., the numbers of buyers’ and sellers’
offers that are successfully matched. The upper panel considers trades among all companies. The lower
panel disregards trades among non-regulated companies and between regulated and non-regulated compa-
nies. “RCs” corresponds to the sessions without non-regulated companies (first pair of sessions); “RCs/1
NGO/1 FI” corresponds to the sessions with 1 eco-group and 1 speculator (second pair of sessions); and
“RCs/3 NGO/3 FI” corresponds to the sessions with 3 eco-groups and 3 speculators (third pair of sessions).
Table 3 reports some summary statistics (standard deviation, standard error, minimum and max-
imum observed) relative to the mean of measure T (t) pooling together all rounds under the three
different conditions. In particular, the upper panel of Table 3 considers the numbers of buyers’
and sellers’ offers that are successfully matched among all companies. To better understand the
contribution of non-regulated companies to the overall liquidity of the permit market, the lower
panel of Table 3 disregards all transactions among non-regulated firms and between non-regulated
14A one-way analysis of the variance, ANOVA, assesses whether the mean of each proposed measure differs
significantly among the three conditions. In our case the null hypothesis to be tested is whether the markets under
the three conditions have the same means of a specific measure. The alternative hypothesis is that at least under
one condition the mean of that measure is significantly different.
15In this last case we know that under other conditions the market performs differently. We do not know, however,
which conditions vary. By assuming equal variances among the tested groups, the post-hoc Tukey test offers an
answer to this question. When the homogeneity assumption is violated we need to run the post-hoc Games-Howell
test.
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and regulated companies. An ANOVA analysis rejects the null hypothesis of the means being
equal across both All Companies and Only RCs treatments at the 1% and 10% level, respec-
tively.16 In addition, post-hoc Tukey test reveals significantly contrasting performances among
the various markets. The level of effective trades is statistically different and, therefore, the
presence of non-RCs adds liquidity to the market.
The second measure #T (t), labeled as volume of traded permits, counts the number of permits
that are successfully exchanged at each period t ∈ [0, . . . , T ]. The total number of allowances
traded measures the activity level of the permit market, regardless of the number of buy and
sell orders left unsatisfied. Ben-David et al. (1999) investigated a the same variable, exchanged
volume, in order to test the activity level of the experimental market.
All Companies N Mean Std. dev. Std Error Min Max
RCs 160 9.76 14.3 1.13 0 75
RCs/1 NGO/1 FI 160 14.02 18.3 1.45 0 127
RCs/3 NGO/3 FI 160 18.07 20.1 1.59 0 100
Only RCs N Mean Std. dev. Std Error Min Max
RCs 160 9.76 14.3 1.13 0 75
RCs/1 NGO/1 FI 160 7.06 11.1 0.88 0 82
RCs/3 NGO/3 FI 160 5.99 8.21 0.65 0 30
Table 4: Summary statistics of the volume of traded permits measure #T (i.e., the number of permits
that are successfully exchanged at each period t ∈ [0, . . . , T ]. The upper panel considers trades among all
companies. The lower panel disregards trades among non-regulated companies and between regulated and
non-regulated companies. “RCs” corresponds to the sessions without non-regulated companies (first pair
of sessions); “RCs/1 NGO/1 FI” corresponds to the sessions with 1 eco-group and 1 speculator (second
pair of sessions); and “RCs/3 NGO/3 FI” corresponds to the sessions with 3 eco-groups and 3 speculators
(third pair of sessions).
Table 4 reports some summary statistics relative to the mean of the measure #T pooling together
all rounds together. As before, the upper panel of Table 4 considers the number of permits that
are successfully exchanged at each period t ∈ [0, . . . , T ]. The lower panel of Table 4 disregards all
transactions among non-regulated firms and between non-regulated and regulated companies. In
contrast to Ben-David et al. (1999), an ANOVA analysis rejects the null hypothesis of the means
of the volume of traded permits being equal across both All Companies and Only RCs treatments
at the 1% level. In their experimental markets, Ben-David et al. (1999) observe that the presence
of (more) heterogeneous agents does not result in higher volumes of trades. In our experimental
market, tests indicates that the total volume of trades in the market with 3 NGOs and 3 FIs is
a great deal larger than the other two markets.
In principle, the larger the number of active (non-RCs) traders, the larger the level of observed
activity on the market. A closer look to our results, however, reveals a few more interesting
16Results of the one-way ANOVA test and summary statistics corresponding to the single rounds are not reported
here for the sake of brevity and are available upon request from the authors.
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results. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports a lower, yet increasing T , the number of trades that
successfully take place at each period. The bottom panel of Table 4, instead, reports a significantly
decreasing #T , the number of permits successfully exchanged at each period. Recalling that
the two measures are re-computed disregarding all transactions among non-regulated firms and
between non-regulated and regulated companies, such results leads to the following considerations.
The contribution of non-regulated companies to the increase in effective trades is significant, but
not exclusively ascribable to them. Such a contribution can be quantified by computing the
difference between T under the various conditions with and without non-regulated companies
and by taking their ratio. Considering 1 NGO and 1 FI, for instance, the percentage of the
increase in T -due to the mere presence of non-regulated companies- which goes to RC, is almost
20 percent. This number is obtained by computing the ratio (1.97 − 1.87)/(2, 41 − 1.87). With
3 NGOs and 3 FIs such a number decreases slightly to 30 percent. Because #T represents
the quantity of permits successfully exchanged (per trade) among regulated firms, its decreasing
trend can be interpreted in a straeighforward way. A significant part of the permits successfully
exchanged (per trade) comes from trades among non-regulated companies or between regulated
and non-regulated companies.
The presence of non-regulated companies, therefore, directly enhance the liquidity of the permit
market, thereby favoring investments in low pollution–emitting technologies. If the market liq-
uidity varies when non-RCs are participating, can we observe an impact on the price variability?
We run, therefore, an exercise similar to the analysis undertaken by Ben-David et al. (1999). The
experimental evidence, they report, is inconclusive. Our analysis is consistent with Ben-David
et al. (1999) findings. In our experiments, in fact, there are only few observations of a high price
variability. These observations, as predicted by Seifert et al. (2008) - Section 4, are concentrated
toward the end of the experimental rounds, i.e. T . On the one hand, because unused permits
have no redemption value after period T, such a higher price variability could be ascribable to
desperate attempts to liquidate permit holdings when the overall market is in permit excess.
On the other hand, because a penalty is levied for non-offset emissions, price variability could
be ascribable to attempts to corner the market when the overall market is in permit shortage.
Despite these few observations of trading behaviors, however, there is no statistically significant
effect of the presence of non-regulated traders on the price variability of allowances.
5 Experiment three: vanilla options and permit price
The fast-growing market for plain vanilla contracts (European options) is another aspect that
has not been theoretically and experimentally investigated thus far. Options should be used
by RCs to optimally manage the costs associated with compliance requirements. For instance,
RCs that adopt the low pollution–emitting technology with the intention of selling unwanted
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permits in the market might be discouraged in doing so by the possibility of not being able
to sell permits at an appropriate price eventually failing to recoup the investment costs. Put
options offer insurance against future permit prices that are too low. Focusing on how regulated
companies make use of such contracts, we investigate RCs’ options trading pattern with respect
to their level of technology adoption and their permit trading strategies. Typically, RCs with an
expected permit shortage (excess) buy call (put) or possibly sell put (call) options. However, the
case of orders to buy calls and sell puts when regulated companies are in permits excess is less
observed.
This experiment structure is built on the previous ones and consists of three sessions. Unlike the
previous experiment, here both regulated and non-regulated companies could trade options. Due
to regulatory stipulations, the cap is fixed and permits cannot be created. Thus, we considered
only option contracts with cash–settlement provisions. Furthermore, as compliance has to be met
only at the end of the regulated period, we make use of European-style options. However, we
set the maturity of the options to not overlap with the end period T in order to test for trading
volume impacts. In particular, a new screen with two distinct columns (one for European call and
one for European put options) appears on the monitor of each computer at time T/2. All options
have a maturity equal to T − 3 and a strike price equal to the permit price ST/2. These at-the-
money options are automatically priced according to the well-known Black and Scholes option
formula, in which volatility corresponds to the square root of the sample variance.17 Therefore,
players are only able to determine the quantity of call or put options using a fixed price menu.
Options contracts are regulated by cash settlement at time T − 3.
Both regulated and non-regulated players actively participate in the options market. We
investigate the supply and demand structure of options with respect to different measures con-
centrating however on regulated companies. In particular, we consider whether the option trading
strategy of each i-th RC is determined by one of the following four measures:















Qi·(t)− (T − T/2) · qiu;
17The volatility parameter used to compute the option price corresponds to the historical volatility. For a sample
volatility smaller than 0.2 or larger than 0.6, the default volatility value is 0.5. It’s worth noting that by using the
Black and Scholes option formula, call (put) options are overvalued (undervalued) when the permit price ST/2 is
close to the penalty level P = 40. Profit seekers could exploit such an arbitrage opportunity by selling call (buying
put) options.
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Ni represents the initial number of permits allocated by the policy regulator to the i-th RC;
#T i(t) represents the number of permits bought (#T i(t) > 0) or sold (#T i(t) < 0) by the i-th
RC at each period t; finally, Qi·(t) corresponds to the emission of the i-th RC at each period t,
under the old (· = old) or the new technology (· = new).
Considering Figure 8, we observe that RCs’ option trading strategies are based on measures
iv. This result may be a not that surprising. It is the first experimental attempt, however,
ascertaining that option contracts are mostly used for hedging purposes. In particular, options
trading strategies are a function of RCs’ current permit portfolio, their abatement investment
status, and their expected future emissions. Figure 8 shows that RCs with a negative expected final
permit portfolio (left x-axis) typically tend to buy call or sell put options (upper-left quadrant).
Players with a positive expected final permit portfolio (right x-axis) tend to buy put or sell call
options (lower-right quadrant). The other strategies outside these quadrants can be properly
explained by the presence of very high strike prices. In theory, a very high strike price would
prompt offers to buy puts or sell calls even during permit shortage (in expectation) - see also the
discussion in footnote 17. Conversely, a very low strike price would prompt offers to buy calls or
sell puts even in permit excess (in expectation).18
6 Conclusions
This paper undertakes an experimental investigation of the investment strategies of regulated
companies in abatement technologies, the market participants trading behaviors, and the liquidity
level of the permit market within an inter-temporal cap–and–trade scheme. The analysis is done
under alternative market structures: (i) in the exclusive presence of regulated companies; (ii)
with the inclusion of non-regulated companies; (iii) under the availability of spot and options
contracts.
18Such dynamics might also be employed to interpret the behavior of non-regulated companies. FIs and NGOs
were expected to buy puts (or sell calls) and buy calls, respectively. On the contrary, when the strike price is very
high or low, they play the role of the option contract counterparty by often entering buy orders for call options.
18
The first experiment investigates the effects of uncertain emissions and uncertain abatement costs
on the timing of regulated companies to invest in an irreversible low pollution–emitting technology.
In line with theoretical models, we observe that the price of permits does not necessarily reflect the
marginal abatement cost (approximated by the expected cost per reduced emission). Although
abatement investments are irreversible and limited in time, the strict enforcement structure in
place prompts early adoption of low pollution–emitting technologies. This result has also clear
policy implications: companies characterized by irreversible investments need to face ambitious
environmental targets, severe penalties, and strict enforcement mechanisms in order to be active.
However, in such a market the permit price might deviate from its well–known theoretical level,
i.e. the true marginal abatement cost.
The second experiment investigates the impact of the presence of non-regulated companies on
overall permit market liquidity. Two different measures of trading activity are presented and
tested: effective trades and quantity of permits successfully traded. In contrast to Ben-David
et al. (1999), we found that the presence of non–regulated companies significantly enhance the
liquidity of the permit market. Despite few observations, the presence of non-regulated traders,
however, has no statistically significant effect on the price variability of allowances. This result
aligns with Ben-David et al. (1999) findings.
Given the fast-growing market for plain vanilla contracts (European options) on emission permits,
the last experiment investigates the options trading pattern of regulated companies with respect
to their investments and permit trading strategies. We observe that option contracts are mostly
employed for hedging purposes. An analysis of the impact of the presence of option contracts on
the permit price dynamics is left for future research.
In this paper, we show that in the presence of irreversible abatement investments and non–
regulated companies, the overall cost of compliance might increase. At the same time, the possi-
bility of realizing a premium propels irreversible and limited-in-time investments. In the presence
of non-regulated companies, these market traders initially sustain the permit price and maintain
market liquidity afterwards. In such a framework, the follow-up questions are: Will the premium
associated to irreversible investments be always reflected in the permit price? Or, will there be a
point at which the cost premium (permit price) peaks then decreases and, eventually, stabilizes
throughout the rest of the trading period? To what extent price containment mechanisms, such
as floor prices or ceiling prices described in Gru¨ll and Taschini (2011), are desirable and effective
instruments to control the allowance price and, ultimately, induce technology investments? These
questions remain for future research.
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7 Appendix
7a Excerpt of the instruction paper
You are participating in an academic experiment. Please carefully read the following instructions
telling everything you need to know for playing. In case of ambiguities please ask the instructor.
You can earn money by collecting Gulden. The experiment consists of 4 rounds with 20
periods each. The experiment restarts at each round. Your earnings depend on your decisions
and on those of the other players. All Gulden you collect during the experiment are converted into
Swiss Francs - 100 Gulden = 60 Rappen. In addition, you get 15 Swiss Francs for participating.
In each period you get information about market prices of permits and total pollution emitted in
the past by all polluters. Based on this you need to decide whether to change technology, whether
to buy or sell permits or to hold on to your permits. You have 60 seconds for deciding. After 60
seconds the next period starts.
Have a look at the picture below showing the screen you are going to face.
1. Here you see the current account and the costs for technology change. It also shows the
probabilities for the changes of your pollution process (sharp increase or mild increase)
2. Shows the current amount of permits you possess, the amount of used permits and the
remaining unused permits. If the last number is below 0, you have to pay a penalty of 40
Gulden at time T = 20 for each unit of negative permit.
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3. This shows respectively the aggregated probability of a sharp movement in the pollution
process of all other players and the aggregated probability of a mild movement in the
pollution process of all other players.
4. This field tells whether you bought or sold permits in the last period.
5. Your total pollution for the current period is calculated here (Actual pollution). Minimum
shows the minimum expected amount of pollution (you get this amount if in the remaining
periods you always face a mild movement in the pollution process). Maximum shows the
maximum expected amount of pollution (you get this amount if in the remaining periods
you always face a sharp movement in the pollution process).
6. This field corresponds to field 5) but with respect to all other players with one time lag in
other words with respect to the previous period.
7. Shows the evolution of prices of emission trading up to the previous period.
8. Shows the evolution of your company’s cumulated pollution.
9. Shows the evolution of the cumulated pollution by the other companies up to the previous
period.
10. Here you can insert an order to sell permits. You can specify quantity and price. You
cannot sell more permits than you currently possess.
11. Here you can insert an order to buy permits. You can specify quantity and price. The total
offer (in monetary value) cannot exceed your “bank” account.
Remark: You can either buy or sell once in a period. After having placed an offer you might
need to wait for other players to place their orders.
12. Time series of the permit price.
13. If you don’t want to buy or sell permits you can press this bottom (please press as soon as
you decide to not entering orders).
14. Here you can change technology. Technology can be changed only once and it costs 400
Gulden. The new technology reduces the sharp pollution increase by half. In this example,
the oncoming possible increases would be 15 instead of 30.
15. Here you can see the total unused certificates of the other participants ranked by player.
Again, the number shows the result of the previous period. This ranking does not report
players’ performance.
16. This is your position in the ranking of box 15).
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17. Room for extra info - if required.
7b Screen shoots
Figure 1: Example of a screen-shot where first the evolution of the permit price is in evidence (upper
part) and then the evolution of the total pollution emissions (lower part).
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Figure 2: Expected cost per reduced unit of emission as a function of the remaining time for Low-
RC (left column) High-RCs (right column). The parameters we use are I = 400, P = 40, {qHu , qHd } =
{30, 10}, {qLu , qLd } = {12, 5}, and p = 50%. As in the experiment, t = [1, 2, . . . , 20].













Figure 3: Hypothetical representation of a one-period bid and ask ordering. The intersection of the
revealed demand (solid) and the revealed supply (dashed) identifies the quantity of permits that maximizes
the traded quantity.
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Figure 4: Histogram of the penalty payments in each of the four rounds averaged across the six sessions.
The vertical axis represent the number of penalties incurred between the amount represented on the
horizontal axis and the maximum possible paid.
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Figure 5: Percentage of Low-RCs (dotted line) and High-RCs (solid line) that adopt the new technology
immediately at period 1 (upper diagram). Percentage of Low-RCs (dotted line) and High-RCs (solid line)
that do not adopt the new technology (lower diagram). Values are computed considering the four rounds
across all six sessions. 27
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Figure 6: Marginal cost approximation (theoretical expected cost per reduced unit of emissions) for Low-RC and
High-RC (upper row) compared to the allowance prices observed during the four rounds of the 5th session.
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Figure 7: Marginal cost approximation (theoretical expected cost per reduced unit of emissions) for Low-RC and
High-RC (upper row) compared to the allowance prices observed during the four rounds of the 6th session.
29
Figure 8: Scatter plot of the options trading strategies with respect to the future expected net permit
position. Diagrams correspond to sessions 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
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